What exactly is public in a public good game? A lab-in-the field experiment by Battiston, P. et al.
Dondena Working Papers 
Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on 
Social Dynamics and Public Policy  
Population Dynamics and Health Unit 
What exactly is public in a public good game? 
A lab-in-the-field experiment 
Pietro Battiston 
Simona Gamba 
Matteo Rizzolli 
Valentina Rotondi 
Working Paper No. 125 
October 2018 
Università Bocconi • The Dondena Centre 
Via Guglielmo Röntgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy 
http://www.dondena.unibocconi.it 
The opinions expressed in this working paper are those of the author 
and not those of the Dondena Centre, which does not take an 
institutional policy position. © Copyright is retained by the author. 
ISSN-2035-2034 
What exactly is public in a public good game?
A lab-in-the-field experiment∗
Pietro Battiston†1, Simona Gamba‡2, Matteo Rizzolli§3, and
Valentina Rotondi¶4
1Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods. University of
Milan-Bicocca
2Department of Economics. University of Verona
3Department of Law, Economics, Politics and Modern Languages. LUMSA University
4Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policies. Bocconi
University
October 23, 2018
Abstract
Are public good games really capturing individuals’ willingness to con-
tribute to real-life public goods? To answer this question, we conducted a
lab-in-the-field experiment with communities who own collective goods. In
our experiment, subjects voluntarily contribute to a common pool, which
can either be subdivided in individual vouchers, as in standard public good
games, or used to acquire collective goods, as it happens for real-life public
goods. We show that participants’ contributions are larger when the voucher
is paid individually, suggesting that individuals’ willingness to contribute to
public goods may be overestimated when based on results from laboratory
experiments.
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1 Introduction
Public good games (PGGs henceforth) are a workhorse of experimental and behav-
ioral economics. The baseline game follows an invariable script: (i) each subject in
a group is endowed with a private good in the form of money or tokens; (ii) each
subject decides independently how much of this private endowment to transfer to
a common pool; (iii) the experimenter increases this common pool according to a
known multiplier, and (iv) the augmented common pool is distributed among the
subjects, usually following an equal split. In PGGs, subjects begin with a private
endowment and then end the game with some private endowment, thus enjoying
(or suffering) a change of utility from their increased (or decreased) private wealth.
So, what exactly is public in a PGG?
The voluntary provision of real-life public goods seems to work in a rather
different way from PGGs. As in PGGs, (i) each member of a community owns
a certain amount of private wealth and (ii) decides how much of this wealth to
transfer to a common pool; (iii) the common pool is then used to buy/build a
non-excludable and indivisible public1 good, and (iv) this good remains shared
among members of the community, leading to familiar social dilemmas. In other
words, in real-life public goods, subjects who belong to a community of people, who
share interests and goals, begin owning private endowments but end up enjoying a
combination of the utility from their private wealth (if any is left) and the utility
of sharing the consumption of the good which, however, remains indivisible.
To see what we have in mind, consider an academic department whose members
want to buy a fridge for their common room. They collect the money on a voluntary
basis, knowing that no member will be excluded from use of the fridge, irrespective
of their contribution. The fridge is an indivisible good, and no member of the
department can privatize the good or its use. Note that without the faculty,
there would be no demand for a fridge to be shared. Given that indivisibility is a
fundamental feature of real-life public goods, the existence of a community – the
academics in our example – is a prerequisite for their existence.
However, communities are usually absent in laboratory experiments. Experi-
mental subjects cannot collectively consume indivisible public goods, so researchers
take the shortcut of splitting the augmented common pool among the subjects.
When using a PGG design, researchers assume that shares of the augmented com-
mon pool generate, for each individual, a utility equivalent to that generated by
the joint consumption (i.e., within a community) of a public good that could be
bought with the augmented common pool. This assumption, however, always re-
mains implicit. Is individual willingness to contribute to a common pool the same
1An indivisible good is a good that cannot be divided among different individuals, be it due
to physical reasons (e.g., a swimming pool) or agreed norms (e.g., a public library). The degree
of indivisibility of a good may vary, but it is a qualifying characteristic of public goods (Sutter,
1996; Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Non-excludability distinguishes public goods from club goods,
and it is the crucial feature of the goods we are dealing with in the present context. In fact, if
these were club goods, the right to use them would be dependent on an individual’s contribution.
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if the common pool is split among group members to buy a private good for each
of them (we call this situation a divided common pool), or if it is used to buy a
public good to be shared by all group members (i.e., an undivided common pool)?
We designed our experiment to address this question.
In our lab-in-the-field experiment, implemented with scout groups during their
summer camps, we proposed a two-subjects linear voluntary contribution mech-
anism (VCM) in which contributions to a common pool are first augmented by
a factor of 1.5 and then paid out in vouchers. The scout patrols we analyze are
naturally occurring communities, and this allows us to account for the sense of
belonging and identity that have been shown to affect contribution in PGGs (e.g.,
Charness et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017). More importantly for our research question,
as part of their activities, patrols engage in fundraising campaigns and collectively
purchase and use indivisible public goods. The extent to which each patrol mem-
ber can benefit from such goods is independent of the individual contribution – be
it monetary or not – to their acquisition (non-excludability). These characteristics
make the patrol goods in all respect public goods.
In our design, we manipulate (i) the divisibility of the augmented common pool
and (ii) subjects’ membership to the same community. Treatment (i) is imple-
mented by paying subjects with either individual vouchers (divided common pool)
or collective vouchers (undivided common pool) to be spent at the local scouting
equipment store. This is a specialized store that sells individual equipment (e.g.,
boots, uniforms, backpacks, mess kits) and patrol equipment (e.g., screw pickets,
field lamps, tents, stoves, woodworking tools). The fact that scouts regularly buy
both individual and patrol goods from the same scout store allows us to have a
comparable payment across the two treatment conditions.
Treatment (ii) allows us to dig deeper into the indivisibility dimension of the
public good and into the role of the underlying community. The two subjects
matched in the VCM could belong either to the same patrol (same community)
or to different patrols (other community). Note that the potential value of the
common pool and the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of the contribution do
not depend on whether the subjects belong to the same or to the other community.
In our two-by-two design, we have a real-life public good only at the intersection
between the same and undivided conditions. At the intersection between the other
and divided conditions, we have a standard PGG.
In sharp contrast with the limited literature on the topic (Alfano and Marwell,
1980), our results show that contributions to a common pool are higher when the
pool is divided and privatized rather than when it is undivided and shared. This
suggests that the high contribution rates typically observed in PGGs are partially
due to having no real public goods in PGGs. Indeed, when using a more realistic
design, contributions decrease to a level closer to the theoretical prediction of zero.
With this paper, we add to the literature studying determinants of voluntary
contributions to public goods, reviewed by Chaudhuri (2011). These determinants
include, among others, identity (e.g., Charness et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017) and
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group membership (e.g., Andreoni and Croson, 2008; Grund et al., 2018). On
the role of community, our second treatment manipulation, an extensive literature
shows the positive effects of in-group matching on solving social dilemmas (Goette
et al., 2006) and other pro-social behaviors (Chen and Li, 2009; Balliet et al.,
2014). This literature also shows that, at least among children, group attachment
is associated with higher contributions to PGGs (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000).
A growing literature also shows that geographic differences in economic outcomes
can be related to a population’s underlying behavioral characteristics, such as
cooperation in PGGs (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Bigoni et al., 2016; Battiston
and Gamba, 2016; Bigoni et al., 2017) or trust games (Bigoni et al., 2016, 2017).
This paper differs from the latter literature in that it focuses on communities, that
is, groups that share a sense of belonging, a common culture, the same geographic
origin, and, crucially, that own and maintain public goods.
With respect to the role of indivisibility (our first treatment manipulation),
PGG designs that envisage a divided common pool became the gold standard very
early on,2 yet we are aware of only one paper that discusses this issue explicitly.
Alfano and Marwell (1980)3 studied the effect of the indivisible nature of public
goods on contributions to common pools in PGGs. In an effort to find an exper-
imental population that was a real group yet had no prior interactions, they ran
the experiment with incoming students who would be residents of the same dor-
mitory floor the following semester. Their results were quite unexpected: students
contributed more to the common pool when it was used to buy an indivisible good
for the dorm floor than when it was divided evenly among them. We bring a fun-
damental innovation to this early contribution. While Alfano and Marwell strove
to neutralize the community dimension of their sample by recruiting experimental
subjects among first-year students,4 we deliberately chose our subjects because
they were members of established communities (patrols) with a history of regu-
lar interactions. This, we claim, makes our design much more similar to real-life
public goods. Other papers have used indivisible payments but have not focused
on the design choice of indivisibility per se: see, among others, Bohm (1972) and
Milinski et al. (2008).
Concerning the experimental population, other social science studies have ex-
ploited the patrol-based organization of scout groups as an observation unit: see,
for instance, early contributions in sociology (Hare, 1952; Kelley and Volkart, 1952)
and more recent work in development psychology (Sharp et al., 2011). To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to study social dilemmas with this population.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on young individuals’ behavior
in PGGs (Zelmer, 2003; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000).
2See Marwell and Ames 1979 and Isaac et al. (1985) for early examples and (Ledyard, 1995)
for an early survey of the literature.
3Note that the same experiment was presented in Marwell and Ames (1981).
4This choice might be due to the limitation of having only one experimental group for treat-
ment, and hence trying to minimize the problem of interdependencies. In our experiment, we
have 31 different groups.
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2 Theoretical framework
Our starting point is a standard VCM. Each individual in a group of N members
is endowed with wi and can contribute xi to a common pool. The overall utility
of the i subject is:
ui(xi) = wi − xi + αG (1)
where G :=
∑N
i=1 xi is the contribution of all subjects to the common pool, and
αG describes the individual utility enjoyed when the total contribution is G.5 The
MCPR from contributing to the common pool is then simply u′i(xi) = α − 1 (the
fact that it is independent from xi being an immediate consequence of the linearity
of the mechanism).
Under-provision of public goods arises if:
(i) α ∈
(
1
N
, 1
)
, and
(ii) subjects do not internalize other group members’ utility.
With regard to condition (i), α > 1
N
implies that the contribution to the
common pool is socially efficient, whereas α < 1 (negative MCPR) implies that a
contribution to the common pool is individually inefficient. Indeed, contributing
to the common pool is a dominated strategy (Isaac and Walker, 1988), as ui(xi) =
wi−xi+αG < wi = u(0). Together with (ii), this condition entails that individuals
will prefer not to contribute to the common pool.
The parameter α can be thought of as capturing two different characteristics
of public goods. On one hand, a single collective good can be more efficient than a
set of individual goods. We denote these scale effects in the production or purchase
of the good with a multiplier σ > 1. On the other hand, public good G is shared
among N subjects, and hence a single individual does not extract its entire benefits
– because individuals do not internalize other members’ utility from it – but only
a share η. Of course, both characteristics can coexist, and thus we can decompose
α as ση. Given this decomposition of α, Equation (1) becomes
ui(xi) = wi − xi + σηG (2)
and the condition α < 1 corresponds to η < 1
σ
< 1 – that is, the share of benefits
the individual extracts is too small to make the contribution individually efficient
despite the scale effect.6
The model can be used to describe both a common pool divided among sub-
jects, as happens in PGGs, and a common pool left undivided and used to acquire
5The assumption that the individual utility from G is proportional to the total contribution is
made for simplicity of exposition; our analysis is compatible with any strictly increasing function.
6The decomposition of α into two factors σ and η which are, in principle, empirically indis-
tinguishable is motivated by our ability to manipulate them individually in our experimental
design.
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a public good to be shared by the subjects. In the case of the divided common
pool, implemented in PGGs, the multiplier effect is determined by fixing σ > 1
and η = 1
N
. Indeed, in PGGs the experimenter augments the common pool by σ
and then divides it among the N members in equal parts. What is called a “public
good” is actually an amount of money directly subdivided among subjects.
When the common pool is used to acquire a real public good, the multiplier
effect of αN will typically originate from both σ > 1 and η > 1
N
, although neither
of the two conditions is strictly necessary.
To account for the positive contributions commonly observed in the experi-
mental literature on public goods, we can relax condition (ii) and enrich Equation
(2) by including an altruistic component:7
ui(xi) =wi − xi + σηG(1 + (N − 1)β); (3)
where β > 0 means each subject values positively the contribution of the public
good to the utility of another participant: individuals will want to contribute to the
public good if ση(1+(N−1)β) > 1. In particular, if β = 1, then ση(1+(N−1)β) =
σηN . Each individual is now internalizing the full social welfare, and thus the level
of contribution is optimal.
In our experiment, we compare the standard PGG design, in which the common
pool is divided (σ > 1, η = 1
N
), with a case in which, for the same value of σ, G
is used to provide a real public good. In other words, we are able to directly test
whether η > 1
N
. That is, we test the attractiveness, for subjects, of the positive
spillovers resulting from a public good, while accounting for (i) altruism (β) and
(ii) scale effects (σ). Indeed, if η > 1
N
, then, controlling for scale effects, individuals
prefer to acquire a public good, because they enjoy more utility from sharing the
good than they loose due to it being a collective property. If the opposite is true,
individuals are willing to acquire private ownership.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted six paper-and-pencil sessions during the summer camp of scout
troops from Trentino-Alto Adige, a region in Northeast Italy. Each troop was
composed of 24 to 32 adolescents, grouped into 4 to 6 patrols, for a total of
31 patrols and 160 subjects evenly distributed by gender (51% males and 49%
females), resulting in 640 observations.8 Each experimental session lasted about
7The distinction between pure and impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990) is beyond the scope of
both the present paper and our experiment. Given that utility is transferred to other members
by virtue of a voluntary contribution, β will in principle include both aspects.
8We ran one pilot session previously in another troop, and one last session was discarded
because the summer camp involved only two patrols that were formed ad hoc and did not reflect
actual patrols operating during the year.
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two hours.9 Subjects earned, on average, e5.11 from this experiment and e10.50
from the entire session.
Patrols are gender-based, naturally-occurring communities that perform activ-
ities together during the whole year and especially during summer camp. Each pa-
trol is equipped with public goods such as tents, stoves, and other camping equip-
ment. These public goods can be expensive (like a tent) or relatively cheap (such
as bags for poles or stakes). During the year, patrols organize several fundrais-
ing activities in order to purchase the public goods necessary for their scouting
activities. For these activities, each scout individually owns private goods, such
as backpacks, boots, and mess kits. Scout patrols share social norms, and they
involve clearly identified individual roles within the patrol.
In the experiment, subjects are matched to play a two-player linear VCM. Each
subject is given e5 of windfall money and has to decide how much of this initial
endowment to transfer to a common pool. The experimenter increases the value
of the common pool by a multiplier (σ = 1.5, see Equation (1)) known to subjects.
We implemented two treatments, with two conditions each, in a two-by-two
within-subject factorial design. The first treatment concerns the divisibility of
the common pool. In the first condition (divided common pool), the augmented
common pool is evenly divided between the two matched subjects. The total
individual payoff, paid out with individual vouchers, is thus the sum of the amounts
subjects have kept for themselves, plus the share of the augmented common pool,
as in any standard PGG. In the second condition (undivided common pool), the
augmented common pool is evenly divided between the patrols of the two subjects,
rather than between the subjects themselves. In the end, each patrol is paid a
patrol’s voucher, summing up all the individual shares of the different common
pools, and subjects receive individual vouchers corresponding to the amounts they
did not transfer to the common pool. The second treatment concerns how the
two subjects are matched: in the first condition, they belong to the same patrol
(same community); in the second condition, they belong to different patrols (other
community). Both treatments are implemented within-subject – that is, each
subject makes four separate choices.10 Actual individual and patrol payoffs only
depend on one of them. At the time they make their decisions, subjects know they
are randomly matched in pairs, but they do not know whether their partner is a
member of their patrol. They also do not know whether the divided or undivided
condition will determine the payments, as this is decided by tossing a coin at the
end of the experiment.
Recall that, within this two-by-two design, the real public good is reproduced
at the intersection of the undivided and same conditions: this is where subjects
9The experimental session included another experiment – see Battiston et al. (2018) – held
before the one presented in this paper. Payments cumulated across the two experiments. Indi-
viduals knew from the beginning that they would perform two activities, but the rules for the
second were explained only once the first was concluded. Subjects were told their cumulated
gains, and paid with the vouchers, only at the end of the entire session.
10The order of the choices was randomized.
7
know their own patrol will receive the entire amount of the common pool. In other
words, they know their contributions to the common pool will be used to acquire
a public good to benefit their patrol. At the opposite end, where the divided and
other conditions intersect, we find “public goods” as they are presented in standard
PGGs – that is, a prisoner’s dilemma game with purely private final payments.
The two remaining combinations (undivided, other and divided, same) allow us to
disentangle the effects of the different treatments.
4 Results
We first analyze subject behavior at the aggregate level.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Condition Contribution (mean) Std. Dev. N
undivided 2.778 1.571 320
undivided, same 3.228 1.485 160
undivided, other 2.328 1.531 160
divided 2.926 1.567 320
divided, same 3.488 1.414 160
divided, other 2.364 1.515 160
same 3.368 1.453 320
Other 2.346 1.520 320
Total 2.852 1.570 640
Table 1 presents an overview of subjects’ average contributions within each
treatment, which are also plotted in Figure 1. Some results are in line with those
generally found in the literature on PGGs: average contributions to the common
pool are significantly different from zero. The data also present clear treatment
effects. A paired t-test across the other -same treatment rejects the null of no dif-
ference, including when we restrict to the divided or undivided conditions (p=0.000
in all three cases). Similarly, a paired t-test across the undivided -divided treatment
rejects the null of no difference (p=0.064), as it does when we restrict to the same
condition (p=0.025); the null is not rejected in the other condition (p=0.744).11
These findings are confirmed by OLS regressions, presented in Table 2. The
main explanatory variables include two dummies for the two treatments (“Divided”
and “Other”) and their interaction. To control for the strong inter-subject hetero-
geneity, we introduce subject fixed effects in columns (1) and (2). In columns (3)
and (4), we control instead for a range of individual-level covariates originating
from the questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment. These include
age,12 a dummy for being male, indicators of personality traits from the “Big Five”
11Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests confirm these results.
12Subjects were between 12 and 17 years old.
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Table 2: OLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divided 0.148* 0.259** 0.169* 0.288**
(0.088) (0.115) (0.092) (0.123)
Other -1.012*** -0.900*** -1.016*** -0.897***
(0.094) (0.116) (0.097) (0.123)
Interaction -0.223 -0.238
(0.141) (0.156)
Male -0.022 -0.022
(0.186) (0.186)
Age 0.240*** 0.240***
(0.089) (0.089)
Household size -0.081* -0.081*
(0.043) (0.043)
Extraversion (big 1) -0.065* -0.065*
(0.033) (0.033)
Agreeableness (big 2) 0.002 0.002
(0.039) (0.039)
Conscientiousness (big 3) -0.006 -0.006
(0.040) (0.040)
Neuroticism (big 4) 0.018 0.018
(0.037) (0.037)
Openness to experiences (big 5) 0.092** 0.092**
(0.043) (0.043)
Trust in patrol -0.094 -0.094
(0.104) (0.104)
Trust in troop 0.249** 0.249**
(0.099) (0.099)
General trust 0.068 0.068
(0.064) (0.064)
Constant 3.284*** 3.228*** -1.642 -1.701
(0.062) (0.072) (1.562) (1.564)
Fixed effects YES YES NO NO
N 640 640 584 584
Note: Independent variable is individual contribution. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 1: Individual contribution (Mean)
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in the revised Italian version of the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Chiorri et al.,
2015),13 household size, and three measures of trust: trust in troop, trust in pa-
trol, and generalized trust. This slightly reduces the sample size because of some
missing answers in 14 questionnaires.
The coefficient for other is negative and strongly significant in columns (1)
and (3), showing that being members of the same patrol has an effect on contri-
butions. Specifications (2) and (4) allow us to evaluate this effect conditional on
the divided/undivided dimension. In particular, the effect in the divided case is
highlighted by a Wald test on the sum of the coefficients for other and the inter-
action term (p=0.000 in both specifications), and the effect in the undivided case
is highlighted by the significance of the “Other” coefficient. This is in line with
results from the t-test and allows us to state the following:
Result 1. Subjects contribute significantly more to a common pool when they be-
long to the same community, regardless of whether the common pool is divided or
undivided.
The coefficient for divided is also statistically significant in all specifications.
13In the Ten-Item Personality Inventory, possible answers to each question range from 1 (com-
pletely disagree) to 7 (completely agree); we measure each personality trait as the score of a
question directly asking about the trait, minus the score of a question asking about the opposite
trait.
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A Wald test on the sum of the coefficients for divided and the interaction term,
however, yields a non-significant result in specifications (2) (p=0.745) and (4)
(p=0.674), confirming that the type of public good (divided or undivided) is sig-
nificant only for subjects belonging to the same patrol. This is again in line with
evidence from the t-test and supports our next result:
Result 2. When matched to a member of their same community, individuals con-
tribute more to a divided common pool than to an undivided common pool.
This latter finding represents the core contribution of this paper. We refer
the reader to the final section for a more exhaustive discussion of the economic
meaning of this result.
Turning to the coefficients of the covariates, we see that contributions are signif-
icantly related to openness (positively), extraversion (negatively), and family size
(negatively). Importantly, scouts showing higher trust in their patrol contribute
more to the public good, suggesting that willingness to contribute to the public
good is strongly related to a sense of belonging. Older scouts also contribute more:
the age variable is strongly correlated with years of permanence in the patrol, so
this finding could reflect a general age effect and a stronger sense of belonging.
Still, if we replicate the analysis independently on each cohort, we find that the
coefficient for divided is always positive (although not significant – note that the
sample size is dramatically reduced). This suggests, at the very least, that our
main effect of interest is robust to differences in a sense of belonging.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The etymology of the word community goes back to two Latin words (cum-munis)
that, combined, mean “to have rights and duties together”. Public goods motivate
the rise of communities and bond them together, inasmuch as communities regu-
late contributions to and rules of use of public goods. If divisibility and community
membership are characterizing elements of real public goods, they should also be
central to the study of public goods in experimental contexts. However, standard
PGG experiments study contributions to perfectly divided common pools by sub-
jects who belong to minimal groups that do not share any sense of community
outside the lab. Real public goods differ from the ones studied in PGGs in at least
these two dimensions (indivisibility and community belonging), and the treatment
variations of our experiment follow these two lines.
Result 1 confirms previous findings that there is a strong difference in willing-
ness to contribute to public goods when subjects belong to the same community
(in-group) versus when they belong to other communities (out-group), as was the
case, for instance, in Harbaugh and Krause (2000).
Result 2 highlights that willingness to contribute to the common pool is lower
when the augmented common pool is used to acquire publicly shared goods, and
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it is higher when such a pool is redistributed privately to subjects, in sharp con-
trast with Alfano and Marwell (1980). In other words, individuals’ willingness to
contribute to real public goods may be well below results found in standard PGG
experiments – including those involving real groups.
One may object that the groups used in this study are small compared to real-
life communities (e.g., members of a research team in an academic department),
and thus they oversimplify the coordination problems that typically emerge in
larger groups. If this is true, our results overestimate voluntary contributions to
real-life public goods, which could, therefore, be even closer to the theoretical
prediction of zero.
One might also attribute our participants’ lower willingness to contribute to
contingent factors such as product availability: simply put, there are way more
private goods to buy than public ones. Note, however, that (i) scouts need both
public and private goods to perform their activities, and (ii) our experiment vouch-
ers could only be spent at the scout store, where the menu of goods was relatively
limited. Indeed, when looking at how the vouchers were actually spent, we found
that subjects purchased both public (first aid kits, bags for poles, stakes) and pri-
vate (T-shirts, hats, compasses) goods. For both types of goods, the cost varied
from e0.80 to e100.14
Finally, one could argue that the fact that subjects remain in a troop for only
four years might reduce the appeal of public goods – but this is not consistent
with our finding that older scouts tend to contribute more.
The strength and the weakness of our design lie in the choice of the exper-
imental population. For PGGs to be representative of real-life public goods, a
community is required. In this respect, scouts represent an ideal population: pa-
trols are organized communities in which each subject continuously benefits from
the patrol’s goods and, at the same time, from their own private goods. All scouts
know the importance of both collective and private goods for daily scout activi-
ties, and thus they are aware of the trade-off in obtaining one additional unit of
a private versus a public good. Recreating a group with these characteristics in
a standard laboratory experiment is arguably impossible. At the same time, our
experimental subjects are a highly select population: they experience life in close-
knit groups, and they are observed in a specific period – adolescence – in which the
sense of belonging to a community can play a very strong role, affecting the desire
to contribute to a public good. And yet there exists a contribution gap between
the standard PGG design and real-life public goods. This gap might represent
a lower bound: in other environments, the perceived utility of real public goods
could be even lower. Future research should test our findings in different contexts.
Keeping the above in mind, our results nevertheless suggest that blind faith
in PGGs as a method for eliciting the desire to contribute to public goods could
lead to overestimated contribution rates. Contributions to public goods observed
14For example, our subjects bought a first aid kit (a public good usually shared within a patrol)
for e13 and a front lamp (a private good usually used during night walks) for e12.50.
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in the lab may not accurately reflect contributions to real-life public goods.
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A Experimental instructions
[Instructions are translated from Italian: they were included in the form distributed
to each participant, and also read aloud. A “totem” is a traditional avatar for
scouts, composed by an adjective and a name of animal or plant. Each participant
was assigned randomly and anonymously a totem at the beginning of the session.
In half of the sessions, the “Baden” activity appeared before the “Powell” one; in
the other half the sessions, it was the opposite.]
In this second phase, you will take part in two activities: Baden and Powell.
We will now read together the instructions of both activities. Afterwards, you will
carry out the procedure individually, by following the instructions step by step.
Only one of the two activities will be paid. We will decide which one by tossing
a coin at the end of this phase: if head comes out, the Baden activity will be paid;
if tail comes out, we will pay the Powell activity. Euros gained in this phase will
be added to those from the previous phase. We will link earnings in this phase to
those from the previous phase thanks to the totem which was assigned to you.
It is very important that you write your assigned totem at the top of this sheet!
INSTRUCTIONS - BADEN
You have e5. You will have to indipendently decide how much to contribute to a
common pool (between e0 and e5). The remaining of the e5 will be left to you.
You have been paired randomly to another member of your troop – who may or
may not be part of your patrol. He or she will also decide how much (between e0
and e5) to contribute to the common pool.
The euros put by you and the other participant in the common pool will be mul-
tiplied by 1.5 (that is, they increase in value by 50%).
If you are both part of the same patrol, all euros in the common pool
(multiplied by 1.5) will be paid to your patrol. If you and the other
participant are part of two different patrols, the euros in the common
pool (multiplied by 1.5) will be subdivided in equal parts between your
patrols.
• Your earnings in this case are given by the euros that you kept for you.
• The other participant’s earnings are given by the euros he or she kept
for him/her.
• If you are both members of the same patrol, the patrol earns the euros in
the common pool (multiplied by 1.5).
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• If you are members of two different patrols, each patrol will earn half of
the euros in the common pool (multiplied per 1.5).
Example: Astute Marmot was paired with Roman Pine. Astute Marmot con-
tributes e4 to the common pool, while Roman Pine contributes e2. Astute Mar-
mot hence keeps e5-4=e1, Roman Pine keeps e5-2=e3. In the common pool
there are e6 which, after being multiplied by 1.5, become e9. Hence, if both are
members of the same patrol, their patrol receives e9, while if they are members
of two different patrols, each of the two patrols receives e4.50.
What happens if Astute Marmot contributes e0 and Roman Pine e5?
What happens if Astute Marmot contributes e2.5 and Roman Pine e2.5?
Now please make your choice in each of the following cases:
If the other
participant is a
member of your
patrol
If the other
participant is a
member of a
different patrol
Euros in the common
pool
Euros you keep for
yourself
The column must sum
up to e5
e5 e5
[“INSTRUCTIONS - POWELL” read as above with the following differences:
the sentence in bold “If you are both part [...] between your patrols.” was replaced
with]
Euros in the common pool (multiplied by 1.5) will be subdivided in
equal parts between you and the other partecipant.
[And the bullet points that followed were:]
• Your earnings in this case are given by the euros that you kept for you,
plus half of those in the common pool (multiplied by 1.5).
• The other participant’s earnings in this case are given by the euros he
or she kept for him/her, plus half of those in the common pool (multiplied
by 1.5).
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[The same example as above was proposed, with its outcome modified accord-
ingly]
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